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Peter Underwood* To Manage Quotas or Manage
Fisheries? The Root Cause of
Mismanagement of Canada's
Groundfish Fishery
The collapse of the Atlantic groundfish fishery is the result of a complex
combination of factors including scientific uncertainties, overfishing, poor results
in capacity control, and ecological conditions. It is argued that the root cause of
the collapse is that the foundation of groundfish management since 1977 has
been single species quotas rather than a sound set of principles for fisheries
resource husbandry. The implications of this for science, management, and the
fish are discussed and a principle based management structure is proposed.
Introduction
The collapse of the Atlantic groundfish fishery represents a devastating
blow to the region's economy and our coastal communities. It also
represents irrefutable evidence as to the failure of Canada's groundfish
management system. Why did this happen? What went wrong with a
management system once heralded and sold world-wide as a model for
coastal states wishing to exercise their sovereign rights to the 200-mile
fishing zones?
Fishermen blame the scientists for poor predictions. Managers blame
fishermen for cheating and misreporting. Politicians are blamed by all for
putting jobs before conservation. Inshore fishermen blame offshore
fishermen. Fixed gear fishermen blame mobile gear fishermen. There is
no shortage of finger pointing in the wake of the crisis. This is understand-
able but, quite frankly, of little benefit when trying to analyze in a
constructive way what went wrong and how to prevent the same thing
from happening again.
In this paper, I point my finger at the foundation of fisheries manage-
ment in Canada-single species quotas. Since 1977, Canada has been
managing, or trying to manage, an increasingly complex regime of quotas
while concurrently losing sight of the objective of managing the fishery.
This analysis will show that Canada's obsession with single species
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quotas has severely undermined the effectiveness of fisheries science,
management, conservation, and most attempts at creating a partnership
with the industry which it regulates.
During the mid to late 1980s when the industry was experiencing good
catches and high prices, criticism of the management regime was not a
popular pursuit. Now that the Canadian experiment in management of
groundfish through quotas has failed, and I challenge anyone who would
still argue otherwise, we must look to fundamental reform of the way we
manage our fisheries.
I. 1977-1994
The expansion of Canadian fisheries jurisdiction in 1977 to 200 nautical
miles was viewed as a major opportunity to rebuild over fished stocks and
to provide jobs for Canadians. At this time, developments in fisheries
management theory and the requirements in the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea' to establish total allowable catches (TACs) led
to a single species quota approach. The idea was that scientists, armed
with the latest in mathematical modelling techniques, could evaluate and
quantify the implications of various harvest levels on the health of
individual stocks. If you fished above a certain threshold, the stock would
be overexploited and depletion would result. If you fished below a certain
threshold, the stock would stabilize and rebuild. Even more exciting was
that these models could be used to project stock levels a decade ahead
given various levels of exploitation.
In practical terms, this approach required that quotas be established for
each groundfish species in each of the numerous statistical areas defined
by the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization. Once the TACs were set,
then they had to be allocated amongst the plethora of competing sectors:
inshore, offshore, fixed gear, and mobile gear. As the decade of the 80s
progressed, the number of fleet sectors increased as industry groups
began to cluster their interests and lobby influence. By the mid to late
1980s, we had an ever increasing number of single species quotas being
shared and managed among competing fleet sectors.
Science and management bought this system hook, line, and sinker. It
was sold to the fishing industry on the promise of stock recovery,
1. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/122
(1982); 21 I.L.M. 1261. Article 62(2) requires coastal states to establish total allowable catches
as a basis forcalculating the surplus to coastal state harvesting capacity and thereby quantifying
the amount available for other states.
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stability, and growth. The problem was that these linear equilibrium
models, based on questionable data and mistaken assumptions as to the
critical and dynamic variables of recruitment and natural mortality, have
proven to be incapable of simulating the complexities of a fisheries
ecosystem.
Canada was off and running with the commitment to conservation and
high tech quota management. Multi-year projections on stock abundance
became the backdrop and collateral for an unprecedented capitalization
in fishing power2 and processing capacity.
II. Implications for Science
Feeding the assessment models with data and calculating all of the
various TACs became the bread and butter for Department of Fisheries
and Oceans (DFO) science. Integrated research into ecosystem dynamics
fell by the wayside. There was an assumption that more research cruises
and more data would improve the reliability of the models. This was not
to be so. Many scientists felt that the priorities placed on stock assess-
ments and serving the insatiable demands of the management process was
leaving a real void in their attempts to understand the Northwest Atlantic
ecosystem as a whole. These views were quickly silenced under a regime
which would not tolerate any dissention as to the validity of the quota
system or its requirement for "applied" rather than "theoretical" research.
The introduction of quota controls also triggered the loss of the fishing
industry as a reliable source of real time data. The incentives to misreport
catches inherent in quota management rendered commercial data almost
useless as an indication of fish abundance. Fishing log books once used
only for data on catch and effort became important tools for enforcing the
new quota regime.
Even of more concern was the widening credibility gap between
fishermen and the scientists. A phenomenal resource of ship time and
ecosystems knowledge was virtually lost to DFO science.
III. Implications for Management
Delivering this increasingly complex system of quotas became the focus
for a growing DFO management bureaucracy. Once the quotas were
established, the painful and adversarial process of allocating them to the
2. Canada, Resource Prospects for Canada's Atlantic Fisheries 1985-1990 (Ottawa: Com-
munications Directorate, Fisheries and Oceans, 1985) Projections contained in this document
were used as a basis for allocation of groundfish resources which in turn constituted the primary
instrument of collateral to finance investment in new harvesting and processing capacity.
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various user groups began. To DFO's credit, a comprehensive consulta-
tion process was developed for this purpose. Industry representation was
ensured through an expanding plethora of area regional and Atlantic-
wide advisory committees. Everyone got their.chance to make a pitch for
their share of the quota.
The problem was not the process but the agenda. No one was interested
in discussing principles of fisheries management. In fact, I recall a day in
1988 when I raised this issue at a meeting of the Atlantic Groundfish
Advisory Committee (AGAC). My thesis was that AGAC and all of its
subordinate advisory committees were myopically focused on the exer-
cise of negotiating the allocation of quotas, not managing the fishery. The
meetings rarely discussed, in any meaningful way, issues such as the
slaughter of spawning fish and juveniles or concerns about misreporting,
dumping, and the general deterioration of the relationship between the
fishermen and DFO.
In my presentation, I argued that fisheries management should be
based on some fundamental principles of prudent resource husbandry,
not some arbitrary reference point based on a linear mathematical model
completely incapable of simulating the complex biological system it
purported to represent. At the close of my presentation, I was thanked for
my comments but told in no uncertain terms that the task of the meeting
was to discuss allocation of quotas. The antagonistic, self-interest driven
horse trading continued. It is interesting to note that DFO finally reached
the same conclusions in 1993.3 The report states:
The tactics have been to control fishing effort through annual single
species quotas for particular areas (i.e. management units). This tactic
involving so-called output controls has not worked during the period under
evaluation (1977-1993).4
The report goes on to say:
There are fundamental problems in conducting a multi-species fishery
with harvesting technology which cannot be targeted selectively. Single
species quota management can exacerbate the problems by creating
perverse incentives as quota limits are reached.5
The failure of quota management as an effective conservation and
management tool was further exacerbated by ineffective implementation
3. Canada, Report of the Workshop on Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Management from 1977 to
1993 by J.R. Angel et al. (Dartmouth: Bedford Institute of Oceanography, 1994). In this
refreshingly critical retrospective, the authors thoroughly document the mismanagement of the
Scotia-Fundy groundfishery. Clearly, the conclusions reached are of equal relevance to the
other regions of Atlantic Canada.
4. Ibid at 11.
5. Ibid.
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of existing input controls. Vessel replacement rules were not enforced,
limited entry had little impact on the increase in fishing power6.Minimum
mesh size regulations were not regularly observed and there was limited
use of closed areas for spawning and juveniles. Micro-management of the
plethora of quotas and an increasingly complex array of fleet sectors
chewed up so much administrative time that fisheries officers became
desk bound paper pushers at the expense of on the ground enforcement
and management.
IV. Implications for the Fish
The fish suffered the most under this system. One after the other, the cod
and haddock stocks were fished to unprecedented lows, many to the point
of near extinction. The decimation of spawning grounds and relentless
pursuit of juvenile aggregations has left many of the stocks in such a
depressed state that their ability to survive a climate of unfavourable
oceanographic conditions is in question. One by one, DFO has been
forced to close fisheries completely or severely restrict effort. The
groundfish collapse is indeed an economic and social calamity of "bib-
lical scale."7
V. A New Approach
The virtual closure of the Atlantic groundfish fishery represents a turning
point in fisheries management. It is increasingly difficult for the quota
management zealots to argue that the system has not failed miserably.
Indeed, international experience with single species quota management
has not been much better. A recent report by FAO concludes that quota
controls and single species quota management is inappropriate in many
cases:
The fact that many conservatively-targeted quota management systems
have failed, even for proprietary resources of EEZ's, should prompt a re-
examination of all facets of the management procedure, from consider-
ations of statistical validity of the sampling scheme, the possibility of
misreporting, the appropriate population models used, and the accuracy of
the parameter values entered in them. The degree to which quotas chosen
6. The limitation placed on issuing new licenses had little impact on actual harvesting
capacity. Larger capacity vessels within the length restrictions, increasingly sophisticated
navigation, and fish detection technology all stymied the half-hearted attempts to control
capacity. In fact, the only real implication of limited entry was to create a significant value in
the fishing license.
7. Canada, Charting a New Course: Towards the Fishery of the Future, Report of the Task
Force on Incomes andAdjustmentin the Atlantic Fishery (Ottawa: Communications Directorate,
Fisheries and Oceans, 1993) (Chair: R. Cashin) at vii.
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correspond to the projected fishing mortality rate has been questioned for
some developed country fisheries. Even more serious in their effect is the
degree to which subsequent catches can be maintained within the quota
allocated, or when politico-economic considerations are allowed to'stretch'
the quotas proposed by fishery scientists.'
Their analysis in evaluating the relative merits of various management
tools goes on to state that: "The objections to the management procedures
(i.e. effort controls) need to be reassessed in light of the recent failures of
quota control."9
The closure of Atlantic groundfish fisheries has reduced the debate
over allocations. You cannot argue over quotas if there are none. The way
is cleared for a real debate over alternative approaches to fisheries
management. This debate is currently being presided over by the Fisher-
ies Resource Conservation Council (FRCC). The most recent report from
the FRCC'0 is full of recommendations on alternatives to quotas. Real
consideration is being given to fish maturity targets, effort controls,
closed areas, and harvesting fish at optimal time of season.
The current fiscal climate is also aiding in the push for reform. DFO
can no longer afford an ineffective and extremely expensive micro
management regime. There is a recognized need to provide a less
antagonistic and more credible management regime in which the fisher-
men play a primary role in research, monitoring, and enforcement.
DFO reform includes a commitment to a more integrated research
program designed to better understand the workings of the Northwest
Atlantic ecosystem. The agenda also includes a focus on government
industry co-management as one of the foundations of future programs.
Increased use of more selective fishing gear and closed areas should begin
to move us towards a system where we are focused on how many fish we
are killing as opposed to how many tons we are recording as caught.
The real challenge for the future is whether we can resist the return to
single species quota management once the stocks have begun to rebuild.
Surely the lesson has been learned. The fishery of the future must be based
8. FAO Fisheries Department, Reference Pointsfor Fishery Mismanagement: Their Potential
Application to Straddling and Highly Migratory Resources, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 864
(Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1993) at 37.
9. Ibid. at 39.
10. Canada, Conservation - Stay the Course: Fisheries Resource Conservation Council
Report to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans: 1995 Conservation Measuresfor the Atlantic
Groundfish (Ottawa: the Council, 1994) (Chair: Herbert M. Clarke). An excellent discussion
on the impossibility of managing fish stocks through quota controls and an outline of what the
authors call parametric management is contained in J.A. Wilson etal., "Chaos, Complexity and
Community Management of Fisheries" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 291.
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on a clear set of principles of prudent resource husbandry supported by
all participants.
We must recognize that sustainability does not equal stability. Govern-
ment, scientists, and managers cannot provide stability and growth in fish
stocks. Like all other natural systems, fish stock abundances will fluctu-
ate. What we can and must do is provide a climate where fish stocks are
maintained at a level where they are capable of surviving an unfavourable
set of oceanographic and ecological phenomenon and capitalizing on a
favourable set. This is the essence of sustainability in a natural ecosystem.
Fisheries science of the future must strive to utilize non-linear math-
ematics and integrated oceanographic research to better understand the
complexities of the ecosystem. This will put us in a position of being able
to better predict the timing and extent of the inevitable fluctuations in
abundance we will face.
Conclusion
Canada has shown conclusively that a single species quota approach to
groundfish management does not and cannot work. The collapse of the
Atlantic groundfish stocks has been blamed on the politicians, on the
fishermen, on the managers, on the scientists, and on mother nature. All
have played a role, but the real culprit is a wonderfully complex and
attractive model of management that has proven to be incapable of
bringing all of the players together and focusing their efforts on ensuring
a sustainable future for our fish and for our coastal communities.
The current crisis in the. groun fish fishery should be all that is required
to convince us that drastic change in the way we do things is required.
There are already signs that some of our groundfish stocks are beginning
to respond to the moratoria on fishing. There are signs that DFO and the
fishing industry are willing to discuss alternative approaches to manage-
ment. There is a window of opportunity here, and I hope we take full
advantage of it.
To manage quotas or manage fisheries? The answer is as clear as the
collapse of the Atlantic groundfish fishery.
